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ARRANGEMENTS 
 
BRENDAN BIFFANY† 
ABSTRACT 
  Under soft dollar arrangements, investment advisers promise 
portfolio trades to participating brokers in exchange for investment 
research or other benefits. Recently, some academics, financial 
regulators, and practitioners have scrutinized such arrangements, 
arguing that they provide an avenue for advisers to unjustly enrich 
themselves at the expense of their clients. However, others defend soft 
dollar arrangements, seeing them as a mechanism for binding advisers 
to clients and increasing client returns.  
  A safe harbor currently protects advisers’ use of soft dollars, so long 
as certain minimum requirements are met. Critics argue that soft dollars 
should be banned outright, contending that advisers should be required 
to pay for all investment research and advisory benefits out of their own 
pocket rather than by using clients’ commissions. Supporters 
recommend maintaining the status quo, arguing that the safe harbor 
promotes access to diverse research that, ultimately, benefits clients. 
  This Note analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of soft dollar 
arrangements, the original rationales for the development of the soft 
dollar safe harbor, and the agency costs and conflicts of interest 
inherent in maintaining the safe harbor. This Note advocates a middle 
ground between maintaining the status quo and banning soft dollars 
outright: a consent and reporting framework for the use of soft dollars 
that is consistent with general principles of agency and the fiduciary 
duties that advisers owe their clients.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Through soft dollar brokerage arrangements, investment advisers 
can use their clients’ trading commissions to pay for research and 
brokerage services. Although the use of such arrangements is “virtually 
invisible” to individual clients,1 soft dollars constitute a billion-dollar 
industry2 in the United States that touches more than ninety-five 
million people.3 Almost all investment advisers have soft dollar 
arrangements with the broker-dealers4 that carry out their clients’ 
transactions.5 
To understand how soft dollar arrangements work, consider the 
following scenario: A parent gives a babysitter ten dollars to buy his 
kids some ice cream. Although ice cream usually costs five dollars per 
pint, the babysitter finds a great deal: four pints for ten dollars. She 
uses the full ten dollars to buy four pints, gives two to the children, and 
keeps the other two without telling the family, using them when she 
watches another family’s kids or keeping them for herself. 
Real soft dollar arrangements are not so different. Clients hire 
investment advisers to research, identify, and execute portfolio 
transactions. When an adviser identifies a trade, he contracts with a 
broker-dealer to execute the trade for the client on the most 
advantageous terms possible. The adviser has a choice in selecting a 
broker-dealer: route the trade through a discount broker that charges 
a commission rate of approximately two cents per share, or, as happens 
more often, route the trade through a premium broker at a rate of 
 
 1. D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency Costs of Soft 
Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 77 (1994). 
 2. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SOFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS, AND MUTUAL FUNDS (Sept. 22, 1998) [hereinafter INSPECTION REPORT], 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm [https://perma.cc/EE5H-8U63]. 
 3. Sarah Holden, Daniel Schrass & Michael Bogdan, Ownership of Mutual Funds, 
Shareholder Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 2016, 22 ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (2016) 
(finding, in mid-2016, that there were 95.8 million U.S. individuals invested in some type of 
registered fund, including mutual funds). This statistic may be under inclusive, as it does not 
include those solely invested in individual accounts through private investment advisers that 
employ soft dollars. Id. 
 4. A broker is an individual who, for a small commission fee, matches buyers and sellers of 
securities in an exchange. A dealer is an individual who purchases securities at one price from a 
seller and then sells those securities later to a buyer at a slightly higher price, profiting from the 
price discrepancy. A broker-dealer acts as both as a broker and a dealer.  
 5. See INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2 (“[A]lmost all advisers obtain products and 
services (both proprietary and third-party) other than pure execution from broker-dealers.”).  
BIFFANY IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2018  10:05 AM 
2018] FIXING SOFT DOLLARS 143 
about six cents per share.6 While either kind of broker can execute the 
transaction, premium brokers provide advisers with additional 
research or brokerage services that advisers can use in managing their 
clients’ accounts—soft dollar benefits. Although these benefits accrue 
to the adviser, the broker’s commission cost comes directly out of the 
client’s holdings.7 
Investment advisers must abide by fiduciary duties in managing 
their clients’ accounts.8 These include the general common-law duties 
of care and loyalty, which require the adviser to seek “the most 
favorable terms” for the execution of client transactions that are 
“reasonably available under the circumstances.”9 However, federal law 
contains a safe harbor provision that protects investment advisers when 
they receive soft dollar benefits: Advisers are allowed to use research 
and brokerage services paid for by one client for the benefit of any of 
their clients without breaching their fiduciary duties, so long as the 
commission paid is “reasonable” compared to the services received.10 
Thus, an adviser can disregard whether his receipts will actually benefit 
the client that paid for them and, instead, seek out services that benefit 
other clients’ accounts. In other words, although soft dollar benefits 
that accrue from a single client’s commission should, in theory, belong 
to that client,11 an adviser is free to use the benefits broadly instead. 
While conflicts of interest inhere in all investment-advisory 
relationships,12 two conflicts specifically relate to advisers’ use of soft 
 
 6. Stephen M. Horan & D. Bruce Johnsen, Can Third-Party Payments Benefit the 
Principal? The Case of Soft Dollar Brokerage, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 56, 57–58 (2008).  
 7. Typically, the price of purchased securities includes the commission. For example, if a 
stock is trading at $10.00 per share, the cost to the client to purchase one share of the stock would 
be approximately $10.02 if the trade is routed through a discount broker, but $10.06 if routed 
through a premium broker.  
 8. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (interpreting a prior 
Supreme Court decision as “recognition that Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to 
establish federal fiduciary standards for investment advisers”). 
 9. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).  
 11. See SOFT DOLLAR STANDARDS § IA1 (CFA INST. 2011) (creating soft dollar standards 
for CFA Institute members centered on the fundamental principle that “[b]rokerage is the 
property of the Client”).  
 12. For example, investment advisers usually earn a flat fee based on the value of assets 
under management. Accordingly, advisers have little incentive to research trades intensively; they 
will only receive “a small share of any wealth increase they generate.” Johnsen, supra note 1, at 
87. When trades are not well researched, clients become worse off. Further, unscrupulous broker-
dealers can cheat advisers and their clients by poorly executing trades, costing the client money 
but saving the broker-dealer the cost of proper trade execution. Id. 
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dollars. First, the safe harbor described above creates conflicts between 
an adviser’s various clients, as advisers need not use soft dollars to 
benefit the specific client whose commissions generated them. Second, 
under the guise of receiving research or brokerage services, an adviser 
may use soft dollars generated from client commissions to enrich 
himself—and trade excessively to increase the value of said 
enrichment.13 For example, advisers have used soft dollars to pay for 
general administrative expenses,14 simply pocketed the money,15 and 
engaged in any number of specific abuses,16 like using soft dollars to 
make rent,17 covering personal travel expenses18 and vacation 
timeshare fees,19 and paying $300,000 toward a marital settlement.20 
Unsurprisingly, one former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Christopher Cox, has called soft dollars a “witch’s brew 
of hidden fees, conflicts of interest and complexity . . . at odds with the 
investor’s best interest.”21  
In light of these abuses, the current framework governing soft 
dollar arrangements should be adjusted, and the safe harbor should be 
repealed. By creating the safe harbor, Congress has allowed advisers 
incredible discretion in their use of soft dollars. The safe harbor runs 
contrary to both advisers’ fiduciary duties and the principles of agency 
 
 13. See, e.g., Sage Advisory Servs. LLC, Securities Act Release No. 7997, 2001 WL 849405, 
at *2 (July 27, 2001) (finding that an adviser misappropriated almost $900,000 in soft dollar credits 
and churned client accounts to generate more credits). This may also motivate an adviser to select 
a broker-dealer based on research rather than execution capability. 
 14. See, e.g., INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2 (stating that advisers have used soft dollars 
to pay for office rent, equipment, cellular phone services, and other administrative costs).  
 15. See, e.g., SEC v. Sweeney Capital Mgmt. Inc., Litigation Release No. 15664, 1998 WL 
102672, at *1 (Mar. 10, 1998) (finding that an investment adviser misappropriated $109,000 in soft 
dollars to pay for, among other things, artwork, furniture, and other personal expenses).  
 16. See Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 54165, 2005 WL 4843294, at 
*2 n.8 (July 18, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Guidance] (listing examples of SEC enforcement actions 
involving client commission practices). 
 17. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2.  
 18. Dawson-Samberg Capital Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1889, 2000 
WL 1092961, at *3 (Aug. 3, 2000).  
 19. J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10100, 2016 WL 3361166, at 
*7 (June 17, 2016).  
 20. Id. 
 21. Joseph Giannone, SEC Head Urges Crackdown on “Soft Dollar” Deals, REUTERS (May 
31, 2007, 2:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/businesspro-sec-softdollars-dc/sec-head-urges-
crackdown-on-soft-dollar-deals-idUSN3122527720070531 [https://perma.cc/VXT7-TSF9].  
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that underlie investor-adviser relationships.22 And the original 
rationales for the safe harbor—promoting the availability of 
investment research and protecting those advisers that use soft dollar 
arrangements, but lack sufficient technology to prove compliance with 
their fiduciary duties—no longer hold.  
Still, soft dollar arrangements should not be banned entirely. 
When employed effectively and in each client’s best interest, soft dollar 
arrangements can be beneficial. Soft dollars can serve to bind the 
broker-dealer executing the trade to the adviser, and the adviser to the 
client, which helps to minimize the agency costs of investment 
relationships.23 Empirical evidence also shows that using soft dollars 
can increase investor returns.24  
If Congress were to repeal the soft dollar safe harbor, the general 
agency laws and fiduciary duties that underlie other agency 
relationships would govern soft dollar arrangements instead. These 
fiduciary duties generally require the agent to make full disclosure of 
all material facts to the principal and gain the principal’s consent.25 In 
keeping with this typical standard, the SEC should require investment 
advisers to obtain consent from their clients before engaging in soft 
dollar arrangements that use client commission dollars. Then, the SEC 
should impose detailed periodic reporting requirements on advisers’ 
soft dollar use, including a quantitative requirement—presenting the 
commission dollars spent and the soft dollar benefits received—and a 
qualitative requirement—discussing how the soft dollar benefits 
received by the adviser are used in the client’s individual best interest. 
By requiring advisers to periodically let their use of client commissions 
see the light of day, this consent and reporting framework would deter 
abuse and, in turn, help clients determine whether their advisers are 
acting in their individual best interests. 
 
 22. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *4 (Apr. 1, 1948) 
(“The very function of furnishing investment counsel on a fee basis . . . cultivates a confidential 
and intimate relationship and imposes a duty upon [the adviser] to act in the best interests of her 
clients and to make only such recommendations as will best serve such interest.”), aff’d sub nom., 
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).  
 23. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87.  
 24. Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 74−75 (finding, through an empirical study, that 
premium commissions are positively related to management fees in the private wealth 
management context).  
 25. See Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000) 
(stating that conflicted transactions will be upheld if the interested party makes full disclosure of 
material facts and gains approval to undertake the transaction).  
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This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides a background on 
soft dollars and their current regulatory framework. Part II discusses 
the benefits and drawbacks of soft dollar arrangements. Part III 
analyzes why the soft dollar safe harbor should be repealed. Finally, 
Part IV sets forth a new consent-and-reporting framework for soft 
dollar arrangements.  
I.  BACKGROUND ON SOFT DOLLARS AND THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
A. The History of Soft Dollars and the Development of Section 28(e) 
From the founding of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 
179226 until 1975, brokers’ commissions were fixed at 0.25 percent27—a 
rate far above the cost of executing a trade. In the years leading up to 
1975, however, the securities industry underwent a period of drastic 
change. Prior to 1940, most securities were held by private, individual 
investors. But, after the Investment Company Act of 1940 
implemented regulations governing mutual funds and other pooled 
investment vehicles, investor confidence in those products increased, 
spurring tremendous growth in institutional portfolio and mutual fund 
holdings.28 As institutional holdings grew, brokerage firms began 
competing to win the increasing trade volume and size caused by this 
concentration.29 Since the fixed commission rate was inflated above 
execution cost, brokers began to offer non-price concessions to 
incentivize advisers to send trades their way.30 Because just a handful 
of full-service brokerage firms produced most of the industry’s 
investment research,31 one popular concession became the “research 
rebate,” whereby brokers would provide institutional advisers with in-
house research, free of charge, by bundling the cost of research into 
 
 26. PETER WYCKOFF, WALL STREET AND THE STOCK MARKETS: A CHRONOLOGY (1644–
1971) 145 (1972).  
 27. James F. Jorden, “Paying Up” for Research: A Regulatory and Legislative Analysis, 1975 
DUKE L.J. 1103, 1105 n.6 (1975).  
 28. See INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 170 (57th ed. 2017) 
(finding the number of dollars invested in mutual funds to have grown from $0.45 billion across 
sixty-eight funds in 1940 to $45.87 billion across 426 funds by 1975). 
 29. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 81.  
 30. Id. 
 31. D. Bruce Johnsen, The SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance: Law and Economics, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1545, 1556 (2009) [hereinafter Johnsen, SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance].  
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their fixed commissions.32 Thus began the development of soft dollar 
arrangements.  
Over time, investors came to express displeasure with the fixed-
commission regime. The high fixed commission cost made it difficult 
for individual investors to participate in the stock market, as 
individuals did not trade in large enough volumes to warrant any 
special incentives like the research rebate.33 Advances in technology 
and the concentrating of assets in the hands of large institutional 
investors prompted advisers to begin developing their own internal 
research, lessening their reliance on broker rebates.34 And, in 1963, the 
Supreme Court delivered a big blow to fixed commissions when it ruled 
that the NYSE was not exempt from antitrust laws,35 causing some to 
suggest that fixed commissions should be outlawed as an 
anticompetitive practice.36  
In light of these developments, Congress and the SEC decided to 
make commissions fully negotiable on national securities exchanges in 
1975.37 With this change, brokerage commissions decreased and 
trading volumes surged.38 Still, most broker-dealers continued to 
bundle their research and execution costs into a single commission.39 
Although many institutional advisers had begun developing their own 
internal research, reliance on broker-provided research remained 
significant.40 Many advisers still depended on the research provided by 
 
 32. Id. at 1557.  
 33. See Kenneth Silber, The Great Unfixing, THINKADVISOR (May 1, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2010/05/01/the-great-unfixing/ [https://perma.cc/5NQ8-XQV6] 
(stating that “[t]he high costs of trading discouraged broad public participation” in the stock 
market).  
 34. Johnsen, SEC’s 2006 Soft Dollar Guidance, supra note 31, at 1556.  
 35. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 364–65 (1963). 
 36. See Silber, supra note 33 (noting that in the aftermath of Silver, the Department of Justice 
asked the SEC to consider whether fixed commissions should be considered an illegal 
anticompetitive practice).  
 37. See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 107–08 (1975) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (2012)) (“[N]o national securities exchange may 
impose any schedule or fix rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other fees to be charged 
by its members.”). 
 38. Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of 
Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 274 (1984). 
 39. Johnsen, supra note 1, at 76.  
 40. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 69 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247–48 (“The 
extent to which a particular investment manager relies on brokerage research varies 
considerably.”). 
BIFFANY IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2018  10:05 AM 
148  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:141 
broker-dealers and wanted to retain those research sources.41 With 
commissions freely negotiable, however, advisers worried about 
breaching their fiduciary duties to their clients if they did not seek the 
absolute lowest execution cost for portfolio transactions.42 But seeking 
trade execution at the discount rate would require advisers to sacrifice 
the opportunity to receive research benefits.  
To allay these concerns, Congress enacted Section 28(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as part of the Securities Act 
Amendments of 1975.43 Section 28(e) provides a safe harbor against a 
breach of fiduciary duty for advisers who engage in soft dollar 
brokerage practices, provided certain criteria are met.44 To take 
advantage of the safe harbor, the adviser must believe, in good faith, 
that any premium commission paid is reasonable in relation to the 
research or brokerage services received.45 When that condition and 
others are met, advisers can “pay up” for research services without 
breaching their fiduciary duties to their clients.  
B. The Structure of a Typical Soft Dollar Arrangement 
A typical advisory arrangement looks like this: Investors hire 
advisers to manage their funds. Each investor has a separate account, 
with separate goals, and the advisers manage each accordingly. In the 
case of a mutual fund, investors put their money into a single pool that 
the adviser manages according to the pool’s singular mandate.46 A 
single mutual fund adviser will often manage multiple mutual funds, 
each according to different mandates. 
Whether managing mutual funds or private accounts, advisers set 
up arrangements with brokers to execute their trades. These 
arrangements take one of two general forms. In the first iteration, the 
adviser and broker might agree that when the adviser sends trades to 
 
 41. See C. Meyrick Payne, “Follow the Money” to Understand Soft Dollars, MUTUAL FUND 
GOVERNANCE CONSULTING, http://production.mfgovern.com/content/view/32/105/ [https:// 
perma.cc/826U-46J9] (“When the rules changed, investment managers wanted to retain their 
research sources.”).  
 42. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70.  
 43. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975). 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Examples of mutual fund mandates include investing only in large-capitalization-value 
stocks, investing only in medium-term, investment-grade, fixed-income securities, or managing a 
balanced portfolio while adjusting the riskiness of included securities based on a target retirement 
year.  
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the broker, the broker will credit the adviser’s account with soft dollar 
credits—say, $0.50 worth of credits for every $1.00 worth of brokerage 
commissions.47 As the adviser trades with the broker, his soft dollar 
credit balance increases. Later, the adviser can exchange the 
accumulated balance for research and brokerage services provided by 
the broker.  
The second form is for the broker, in advance, to provide credits 
to pay a portion of the adviser’s research bill with an independent 
research provider. In return, the adviser agrees to send the broker 
future trades at premium commission rates. For example, the broker 
may provide the adviser with $200,000 of research credits up front if 
the adviser agrees to send the broker trades over a certain period of 
time to generate $400,000 in brokerage commissions, which would be 
considerably more than the amount required to cover the broker’s 
execution costs.48 Notably, under this kind of arrangement, the 
adviser’s duty to seek best execution49 eliminates any obligation to 
continue sending trades to the broker if the adviser feels the broker is 
inadequately executing the trades.50  
Under both types of agreement, the clients pay the brokerage 
commissions, not the adviser. Thus, soft dollar arrangements allow 
advisers to employ clients’ premium commission dollars in order to 
obtain research and brokerage services for their own use. 
C. The Soft Dollar Safe Harbor’s Scope 
The financial regulatory framework in the United States promotes 
soft dollars by providing a safe harbor for their use. Section 28(e)’s safe 
harbor provides that  
[n]o person . . . in the exercise of investment discretion with respect 
to an account shall be deemed to have acted unlawfully or to have 
breached a fiduciary duty under State or Federal law . . . solely by 
reason of his having caused the account to pay a . . . broker . . . an 
amount of commission for effecting a securities transaction in excess 
 
 47. See, e.g., Marvin & Palmer Assocs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1841, 1999 
WL 777443, at *2 (Sep. 30, 1999) (describing a brokerage arrangement whereby the adviser 
“receives $[0].50 in soft dollar credits for each $1.00 in brokerage directed to the Broker.”).  
 48. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (providing a similar example arrangement). 
 49. On the duty of best execution, see JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1032–33 (7th ed. 2015) 
(describing the scope of the duty of best execution).  
 50. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (“[T]he manager is free to terminate the broker 
at any time with no legal obligation to make the promised trades.”).  
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of the amount of the commission another . . . broker . . . would have 
charged for effecting that transaction, if such person determined in 
good faith that such amount of commission was reasonable in relation 
to the value of the brokerage and research services provided . . . 
viewed in terms of either that particular transaction or his overall 
responsibilities with respect to the accounts as to which he exercises 
investment discretion.51 
Thus, if an adviser meets certain requirements when undertaking a soft 
dollar arrangement, the safe harbor prevents the adviser from 
breaching his fiduciary duties by paying premium commissions to 
receive soft dollar benefits. To take advantage of the safe harbor, an 
adviser (1) must have “investment discretion” over a client’s account,52 
(2) can only receive “brokerage and research services” in exchange for 
the premium commission53 which (3) must be “provided by” the broker 
effecting the transaction,54 and (4) must determine “in good faith” that 
the commission paid was “reasonable” in light of the brokerage and 
research services he receives.55  
Only “brokerage and research services” qualify for the soft dollar 
safe harbor.56 Section 28(e) itself defines research services as “advice,” 
“analyses,” or “reports.”57 This research must be “the expression of 
reasoning or knowledge” and provide “lawful and appropriate 
assistance in making investment decisions,”58 in addition to analyzing 
 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1) (2012).  
 52. Id. Section 3(a)(35) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a person exercising 
investment discretion as someone “authorized to determine what securities or other property 
shall be purchased or sold by or for the account.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(35).  
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1). 
 54. Id. To “effect the transaction,” the broker executes, clears, or settles the trade. Id. Of 
course, when a broker provides an adviser with its own proprietary research or brokerage services 
the “provided by” requirement is met. Id. But the requirement can cause confusion when a broker 
does not provide its own proprietary research, but, rather, provides the adviser with soft dollar 
credits that the adviser can use to purchase third-party research. So long as the broker is legally 
obligated to pay for the product, the broker will be considered to have provided the research. 
Interpretive Release Concerning the Scope of Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Related Matters, Exchange Act Release No. 23170, 1986 WL 630442, at *5–6 (Apr. 23, 
1986) [hereinafter 1986 Guidance]. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1). The scope of these requirements has been clarified through SEC 
interpretive releases, most recently in 2006. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16. 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(1). 
 57. Id. § 78bb(e)(3)(A)–(B).  
 58. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *15–16. The lawful and appropriate assistance standard 
focuses on how a manager uses eligible research. For example, an adviser that uses client 
commissions to pay for analyses of account performance would not be protected by the safe 
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certain subject matter59 to qualify. Under this definition, verbal reports 
on company performance from corporate executives,60 seminars and 
conferences relating to research, and traditional stock or economic 
reports may all be eligible for safe harbor protection.61 Importantly, 
though, the travel and expenses related to obtaining research services 
are not protected.62  
Section 28(e) defines brokerage services as the effectuation of 
securities transactions and “functions incidental thereto.”63 These 
incidental functions include, among other things, clearance 
(reconciling orders between transacting parties), settlement 
(effectuating the exchange of money for securities), and custody.64 To 
the extent that any brokerage or research services are mixed-use, 
where part of the service qualifies under the safe harbor and part of it 
does not, the adviser may only use client commission dollars to pay for 
the portion that qualifies.65  Additionally, in order to benefit from the 
safe harbor, the adviser must make a good-faith effort66 to determine 
whether any premium commission paid is reasonable in light of the 
products and services received.67 The reasonableness of services 
received, as compared to the commission paid, can be “viewed in terms 
of either [the specific client] transaction or his overall responsibilities 
 
harbor if those analyses were used for marketing purposes, because marketing does not aid in 
investment decision making. Id. at *19.  
 59. The statute lists “advice . . . as to the value of securities, the advisability of investing in . . . 
securities, and the availability of securities” or “analyses and reports concerning issuers, 
industries, securities, economic factors and trends, portfolio strategy, and the performance of 
accounts” as the research subject matters that qualify for the safe harbor. 15 U.S.C § 
78bb(e)(3)(A)–(B). 
 60. The form the research takes—for example, whether oral or written—is irrelevant to 
whether it falls under the safe harbor. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *11.  
 61. Id. at *12.  
 62. Id. at *12 n.92.  
 63. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(3)(C) (2012). 
 64. Id. The SEC applies a “temporal standard” when considering whether brokerage services 
are eligible under the safe harbor. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *17. The safe harbor 
encompasses brokerage “services related to execution of securities transactions begin[ning] when 
an order is transmitted to a broker-dealer and end[ing] at the conclusion of clearance and 
settlement of the transaction.” Id. For example, long-term custody services do not qualify under 
the safe harbor because they continue past the clearance and settlement of the transaction. Id. at 
*19.  
 65. 2006 Guidance, supra note 16, at *20.  
 66. The burden of proof lies with the adviser to demonstrate his good-faith determination. 
Id. at *20–21. While good faith can be difficult to prove, research offered at an unbundled rate 
with a known market value can help the adviser make a good-faith determination. Id. at *21. 
 67. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1). 
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with respect to the accounts as to which he exercises investment 
discretion.”68 This allows the adviser to disregard the question of 
whether the soft dollar benefits he receives directly benefit the account 
that generated the benefits.69 Instead, one client’s commissions can be 
used to purchase services that primarily or entirely benefit other 
clients’ accounts.  
In short, by meeting the safe harbor’s requirements, advisers can 
cause their clients to pay premium commissions for soft dollar 
benefits—and use those benefits as they please—without breaching 
their fiduciary duties.70 Still, if at least one requirement is not met, the 
adviser cannot take advantage of the safe harbor, and soft dollar use 
becomes regulated by the traditional fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty.71 
D. Required Disclosures for Soft Dollar Arrangements 
As fiduciaries, advisers have a duty to disclose to their clients all 
material information regarding potential or actual conflicts of 
interest.72 In addition to this general duty, advisers engaged in soft 
dollar arrangements must comply with all federal securities law 
disclosure requirements, whether or not the arrangements fall within 
the Section 28(e) safe harbor.73 Currently, primary soft dollar 
disclosures are housed in Form ADV, the main disclosure document 
for advisers.74 Advisers are required to deliver Form ADV to each 
 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247 (“It is thus 
unnecessary for the money manager to show that specific services benefitted specific accounts.”). 
For example, assume Client A only trades in fixed income securities. Client A’s premium 
commission dollars can be used to purchase equity research, even though Client A will never 
benefit from that research. A similar outcome holds in the case of mutual funds managed to 
specific security-based mandates. However, almost all types of research will benefit mutual funds 
managed to target retirement dates or those that employ balanced asset allocations.  
 70. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1).  
 71. As agents, investment advisers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. See Santa Fe Indus., 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (stating that the Supreme Court recognized “that 
Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish federal fiduciary standards for 
investment advisers.”). The safe harbor presents only a narrow exception to those duties; if its 
requirements are not met, normal fiduciary duties apply.  
 72. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *6 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 
375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963)).  
 73. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e)(2).  
 74. In the mutual fund context, Form N-1A also requires a description of how transactions 
in portfolio securities are processed, as well general descriptions of how brokers are selected and 
how the reasonableness of commissions paid is evaluated. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM N-
BIFFANY IN PP (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2018  10:05 AM 
2018] FIXING SOFT DOLLARS 153 
client when they first contract and annually thereafter.75 Form ADV 
contains a wealth of information, both general—statements regarding 
the adviser’s ownership and affiliations, and the education of its 
managers—and specific—disclosures on matters like soft dollar usage 
and disciplinary events, as well as fee schedules for the advisory 
services offered.76 The soft dollar disclosures included in Form ADV 
are generally qualitative and descriptive in nature, putting clients on 
notice of the existence of soft dollar arrangements,77 but revealing little 
about their advisers’ actual use of soft dollars. 
Clients receive additional information about their advisers’ soft 
dollar usage in Form ADV’s Part II, Item 12, which houses brokerage 
practice disclosures. Its purpose is to help clients evaluate any conflicts 
of interest inherent in their advisers’ arrangements by providing 
material information about the advisers’ brokerage practices.78 Item 12 
requires disclosure of the factors considered in selecting brokers and 
determining their compensation.79 And Item 12 requires advisers to 
disclose any conflicts of interest created by soft dollar benefits they 
receive.80 
Soft dollar disclosures under Item 12 include three general 
statements. First, advisers must explain that they benefit when they use 
client brokerage commissions to obtain research or brokerage services 
because they do not have to pay for those products themselves.81 
Second, advisers must disclose that they have an incentive to select a 
broker based on their own interest in receiving research, rather than 
the client’s interest in receiving the most favorable execution terms.82 
And third, advisers must disclose the fact that they may cause clients 
 
1A, at Item 21 (2017). Mutual funds must also disclose the amount of transactions and 
commissions directed to certain brokers in exchange for research services. Id. 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(b) (2017). 
 76. Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Mar. 11, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersformadvhtm.html [https://perma.cc/9AUB-L5P9]. 
 77. See Disclosure of Brokerage Placement Practices by Registered Investment Companies 
and Certain Other Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6019, 1979 WL 405250, at *1 (Jan. 30, 1979) 
[hereinafter 1979 Release] (describing Form ADV’s disclosures as “narrative, but not statistical, 
disclosure requirements”). 
 78. See id. at *5–7 (discussing the background and purpose of the disclosures required in 
what is now Item 12 of Form ADV).  
 79. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, at Part 2, Item 12 (2017). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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to pay commissions greater than those charged by discount brokers in 
order to receive soft dollar benefits.83  
Item 12 also requires some specific soft dollar disclosures. An 
adviser must disclose whether he uses soft dollar benefits to service all 
client accounts or only the accounts that paid for the benefits.84 In 
doing so, he must disclose whether he seeks to allocate soft dollar 
benefits proportionally according to the credits each client account 
generates.85 And the adviser must disclose the general types of 
products and services he acquired with client commissions,86 as well as 
the procedures he used to direct client transactions to premium 
brokers.87  
Form ADV’s disclosures represent baseline, mandatory 
requirements. However, under current SEC guidance, more 
disclosures may be necessary to ensure that clients receive all material 
information regarding adviser brokerage placement practices.88 
Outside of Form ADV, advisers must quantitatively disclose the 
aggregate dollar amounts of brokerage commissions paid in each of the 
last three years to affiliated brokers.89  
Even with Form ADV’s disclosure requirements, clients are left 
with an imperfect picture of their advisers’ soft dollar usage. Required 
disclosures are generally qualitative rather than quantitative, which 
inhibits clients’ understanding of how their advisers’ policies affect 
them individually and stifles effective monitoring. Furthermore, these 
brokerage practice disclosures are just one small part of a very lengthy 
document covering a multitude of topics. In this sea of information, 
what is not required to be disclosed becomes as important as what is 
required. Despite SEC Rule 204-2’s requirement that the adviser 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. The adviser must only “state the types of products . . . or services obtained with enough 
specificity so that clients can understand what is being obtained” and “need not list individually 
each product . . . or service received.” 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *7 n.29.  
 87. FORM ADV, supra note 79, at Item 12(1)(f).  
 88. 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *4.  
 89. Id. at *7–8. Affiliated brokers are those that have non-arm’s-length relationships with 
advisers. For the most recent fiscal year, advisers must also disclose the percentage of total 
brokerage commissions paid to each affiliated broker and the percentage of transactions, in dollar 
value, involving each affiliated broker. Id. at *8.  
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“make and keep true, accurate and current . . . books and records”90 
containing “sufficient details relating to each [soft dollar] 
transaction,”91 there are surprisingly few quantitative disclosure 
requirements. Quantitative disclosure of the value of research and 
brokerage services received from client commissions is not required, 
nor is an accounting of the value of services that go to benefit specific 
client accounts.  
Moreover, SEC Rule 31a-1 requires investment companies, like 
mutual funds, to maintain detailed quarterly records, including how 
they divide brokerage commissions on transactions, any benefits 
received, and the nature of those benefits.92 Rules like 204-2 and 31a-1 
require advisers to maintain records on their soft dollar arrangements 
and transactions, but specific retrospective disclosure of benefits 
received and the allocation of those benefits is generally not required. 
This inhibits clients’ ability to monitor advisers’ soft dollar 
arrangements and makes it easier for unscrupulous advisers to misuse 
or misappropriate client commission dollars. 
II.  BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF SOFT DOLLARS 
When advisers abuse soft dollar arrangements, their clients 
suffer.93 Recognizing this, and in contrast to the permissive approach 
taken by the United States, the European Union has sought to curb 
these abuses by restricting adviser payments for research to specific 
payment accounts,94 in turn limiting the long-held use of commissions 
to obtain soft dollars.95 However, following the European Union model 
or eliminating soft dollars entirely would be unwise: soft dollars, when 
used appropriately, can be highly beneficial to investors. 
 
 90. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2017). It appears that this Rule was first applied to keeping 
records of transactions in soft dollars in the SEC’s 1986 Guidance. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, 
at *8. 
 91. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *8.  
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 270.31a-1(b)(1) (2017). 
 93. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Report Faults ‘Soft Dollar’ Use by Brokers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
23, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/23/business/report-faults-soft-dollars-use-by-
brokers.html [https://perma.cc/MQ7T-HA55] (presenting the criticism that advisers abuse clients’ 
soft dollars and do not provide adequate disclosure of their practices).  
 94. SEC Issues Relief for Research Payments Under MIFID II, FRONTLINE COMPLIANCE 
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://frontlinecompliance.com/sec-issues-relief-for-research-payments-under-
section-28e/ [https://perma.cc/L94B-XJVR]. 
 95. The Future of Investment Research Post-MiFID II, BLOOMBERG INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 
9, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/future-investment-research-post-mifid-ii/ 
[https://perma.cc/NW8P-2BQ2].  
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This Part will explore some of the abuses that have emerged from 
soft dollar arrangements, while also highlighting the benefits that soft 
dollars can bring to investors if utilized appropriately.  
A. Conflicts of Interest and Inadequate Disclosure Requirements Can 
Result in Soft Dollar Abuses 
The market for soft dollars purchased with client brokerage 
commissions is estimated to exceed $1 billion per year.96 Although 
most investment advisers participate in soft dollar arrangements,97 the 
SEC has found that advisers frequently fail to provide meaningful 
disclosures regarding these arrangements to their clients.98 A full 2 
percent of soft dollar benefits obtained by advisers are unrelated to 
research or brokerage services and, therefore, fall outside of the 
Section 28(e) safe harbor.99 This constitutes approximately $20 million 
per year. Soft dollars might be used to pay for advisers’ office rent, 
salaries, travel expenses, financial certification exam review courses, or 
industry association dues.100  
The use of soft dollars outside the safe harbor without adequate 
disclosure has prompted the SEC to bring administrative proceedings 
against a multitude of investment advisers and broker-dealers.101 For 
example, the SEC took action against Marvin & Palmer Associates, 
Inc. for violating the Investment Advisers Act when it improperly 
directed soft dollars to friends of the firm.102 There, Marvin & Palmer 
directed its broker, with whom it had a soft dollar arrangement, to pay 
invoices submitted by MacThom Associates, purportedly for 
research.103 Although the broker paid MacThom $920,000, MacThom 
only provided $63,000 worth of research to Marvin & Palmer.104 The 
balance was in fact paid to compensate MacThom’s principal, who was 
a close friend of Marvin & Palmer’s principal, as well as the family of a 
deceased business associate for their efforts in making introductions 
 
 96. INSPECTION REPORT, supra note 2. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. See 2006 Guidance, supra note 16 (listing administrative proceedings initiated by the 
SEC). 
 102. Marvin & Palmer Assocs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1841, 1999 WL 
777443, at *1 (Sept. 30, 1999).  
 103. Id. at *2. 
 104. Id. 
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and business referrals early in the firm’s existence.105 Neither the 
existence nor the terms of Marvin & Palmer’s soft dollar arrangement 
were disclosed to its clients,106 and, aside from the $63,000 of research, 
no benefit accrued to Marvin & Palmer’s clients from the payments to 
MacThom.107 The SEC found Marvin & Palmer to have violated the 
Investment Advisers Act through its improper soft dollar practices and 
disclosures.108 
In another recent, egregious example of soft dollar abuse, the 
advisory firm J.S. Oliver used over $1.1 million in soft dollars to pay 
expenses that benefited its principal and others.109 This included (1) a 
$482,381 soft dollar payment to a former employee for operating its 
soft dollar program, (2) a $329,365 payment to its principal’s former 
spouse in connection with a marital settlement agreement, (3) $300,000 
in rent payments to a company owned by its principal on a building the 
principal sometimes used as his personal residence, and (4) $40,000 to 
the St. Regis Residence Club in New York City for a timeshare its 
principal maintained there.110 J.S. Oliver disclosed on Form ADV that 
it might use soft dollars for research and brokerage services, but did 
not disclose that soft dollars would be used for the four above 
payments, which violated federal securities laws.111 The SEC found that 
J.S. Oliver violated the Securities Exchange Act and Investment 
Advisers Act,112 ordered that the firm pay $6,625,000 in civil monetary 
penalties and disgorge $1,376,440, and banned its principal from the 
securities industry.113  
As these stories and others illustrate, soft dollars provide an 
avenue for advisers to use client commissions to unjustly enrich 
themselves. Inadequate disclosure requirements contribute to these 
abuses. The lack of required reporting on the advisers’ actual use of 
soft dollars allows unscrupulous advisers, as in both examples above, 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. In fact, Marvin & Palmer’s Form ADV responded “no” to the question whether it 
“receiv[ed] some economic benefit . . . from a non-client in connection with giving advice to 
clients.” Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at *3–4.  
 109. J.S. Oliver Capital Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No. 10100, 2016 WL 3361166, at 
*6 (June 17, 2016).  
 110. Id. at *7.  
 111. Id. at *8.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at *10. 
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to hide behind general Form ADV disclosures while actually using 
client-generated soft dollars in ways inconsistent with the advisers’ 
disclosed policies. Disclosure requirements mandating that advisers 
account specifically for their actual uses of soft dollars may deter these 
abuses outright by enabling better client monitoring. At a minimum, 
quantitative reporting requirements would be an additional hurdle 
over which unscrupulous advisers would have to jump to successfully 
misuse client commissions.114 Any mistake, however small, in preparing 
false quantitative reports would make client detection of abuses more 
likely by increasing clients’ ability to track soft dollar use across time 
periods and categories.  
Soft dollar arrangements invite abuses and conflicts of interest. 
This is a strong reason for restricting or eliminating their use. But soft 
dollars can provide benefits to investors, too. These benefits, discussed 
immediately below, caution against an outright ban as the best solution 
to the soft dollar problem.  
B. The Benefits of Soft Dollars 
When employed effectively, soft dollars can benefit client 
accounts. Soft dollars provide managers with the opportunity to obtain 
more and differentiated research, which can help them make better 
decisions in managing client accounts.115 Soft dollars can also work to 
bind both the broker’s and the adviser’s interests to those of the client, 
reducing agency costs.116 Presumably due to these benefits, empirical 
 
 114. The proposed requirements would force those advisers still willing to lie on quantitative, 
ex post disclosures to create fake ledgers and keep corresponding false reports in order to avoid 
detection by clients. 
 115. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Using Bond Trades to Pay for Third-Party Research, *14–16 
(George Mason Univ. Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 10–33), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1647277 [https://perma.cc/GHF7-NUSP] 
(noting that active managers’ returns from stock-picking can be persistently successful, and that 
private money managers can use investment research to increase client returns). Maintaining the 
availability of research was an important reason for implementing the safe harbor in the first 
place. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Future Structure of the Securities Markets, 37 Fed. Reg. 
5286, 5290 (Feb. 4, 1972) [hereinafter Future Structure of the Securities Markets] (noting that “it 
is . . . essential that . . . the viability of the process by which research is produced and disseminated 
not be impaired”). 
 116. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87, which discusses how advisers, brokers, and clients can 
increase their wealth by structuring their relationships more efficiently through the use of soft 
dollars. Soft dollars can also bind the broker and adviser to the client, thereby decreasing agency 
costs across multiple dimensions, including quality, timeliness, and price. Id. 
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research has shown that accounts managed by advisers that participate 
in soft dollar arrangements earn higher risk-adjusted returns.117  
Soft dollars also benefit client accounts by increasing the total 
availability of research on the market and facilitating its transfer.118 
Simply put, when more information is available, advisers can make 
better decisions in allocating client capital to its most efficient uses. The 
more varied and broad the information an adviser can receive, the 
more informed an adviser can be in making investment decisions for 
his clients.119 Without soft dollars, broker-dealers would be less likely 
to invest in the capacity to produce investment research,120 which has 
not been historically profitable for full-service brokerages. Soft dollar 
arrangements incentivize brokers to invest in research services, thus 
providing advisers “with a continuous flow of information and opinions 
on securities, thereby leading in theory to confidence and better 
judgments.”121  
Soft dollars can also work to align the adviser’s incentives with the 
client’s interests. As with most principal-agent relationships, there 
exists in the adviser-client relationship the possibility of “shirking,” 
where the adviser exerts less effort than the client would prefer.122 
Because the adviser’s fee is typically based on assets under 
management, his compensation is only indirectly dependent on his 
ability to create investment gains for his clients.123 This fee structure 
 
 117. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 71 (finding that increasing the use of premium 
commissions to obtain soft dollars “increases performance by 4.3 basis points per quarter, or 
about 13 basis points annually”). 
 118. Future Structure of the Securities Markets, supra note 115 (“[T]he general availability of 
information concerning virtually every aspect of operations and prospects of corporate issuers has 
been one of the most important elements . . . contribut[ing] to phenomenal growth [in the 
American capital markets].”).  
 119. See THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, SOFT DOLLARS AND OTHER TRADING 
ACTIVITIES § 1:20, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017) (stating that additional research 
“should result in the most effective management of client accounts”). 
 120. See id. (engaging the argument that, if research were only available via hard dollars, a 
significant number of institutions would choose not to develop research capabilities, given how 
difficult it is to make research a profitable line of business).  
 121. Id. 
 122. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (noting that agency costs, 
which arise in any principal-agent relationship, are closely related to the problem of shirking).  
 123. Typically, when an investment adviser creates gains for a client, the adviser’s 
compensation grows in tandem with the base of assets under management. However, most 
advisers do not receive compensation based on a portion of the gains themselves. For this reason, 
“even the highest-paid fund managers receive just a small share of any wealth increase they 
generate for the fund.” Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87. 
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disincentivizes advisers from exerting sufficient effort to research 
securities and make profitable trades for clients, as they do not directly 
reap the benefits of those activities.124 Further, if the adviser’s contract 
states that he must bear all the costs of inputs into the investment 
process, such as research, he will likely shirk by devoting fewer 
resources to research, thereby reducing his costs and increasing his 
profitability.125 
Soft dollar arrangements counteract shirking by binding advisers’ 
interests to those of their clients. By tying transaction execution to 
research at a fixed ratio, advisers’ incentives become tied to their 
clients’ incentives.126 Soft dollar arrangements allow advisers to 
increase their access to investment research by upping the number of 
transactions in their clients’ accounts—more transactions, more 
research—which reduces shirking. But because brokerage commission 
costs are larger than the soft dollar benefits received in each 
transaction, and commissions come directly out of clients’ holdings, 
advisers must only increase trading when the corresponding research 
will justify the costs by increasing returns on future trades.127 
Otherwise, the research earned through overtrading would result in a 
drag on client returns, causing the market to punish the adviser through 
fleeing clients. Ultimately, soft dollar arrangements cause advisers to 
be more proactive in managing client accounts, but only when the 
potential to benefit the client’s portfolio exists. 
While compensating the adviser based on performance could also 
help alleviate shirking, fees based on assets under management are an 
industry norm. Threatening this norm would likely generate 
substantial pushback from advisers looking for low-risk revenue. 
Further, it could deter advisers from contracting with young investors, 
who have a greater capacity for risk, or force the cost of advisory 
services to prohibitively high levels. But another avenue—subsidizing 
 
 124. See id. (asserting that advisers will have too little incentive to perform well-researched 
trades if they do not benefit directly from research-related gains).  
 125. See id. (maintaining that advisers will have too little incentive to perform well-researched 
trades if they have to pay for research out of their own pockets). 
 126. See id. at 99 (explaining that tying investment research to execution at a fixed rate 
requires the adviser to “use investment research and executions in equal proportions,” leading 
the adviser to “devote an even greater level of inputs to identifying profitable portfolio trades”). 
 127. See id. (observing that tying research availability to portfolio executions at a fixed rate 
aligns the client and adviser’s interests to promote beneficial trading). 
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the adviser’s costs of generating profitable trades—can prevent 
shirking.128  
Soft dollar arrangements also tie the interests of broker-dealers to 
those of the client. Like advisers, brokers are also prone to shirk. For 
instance, a broker might search haphazardly for better prices, thus 
leaking information on impending trades, or simply execute a trade 
carelessly, rather than working hard to ensure the price impact of the 
trade works in the client’s favor.129 Compounding this problem is the 
fact that the true costs of effecting a trade are virtually impossible to 
measure in the short run—the value of a broker can typically only be 
seen over time through repeated trading.130  
However, soft dollar arrangements can discourage broker shirking 
by giving advisers discretion over transaction volume. Recall that it is 
common for brokers to provide up-front research credits to advisers 
with the expectation that the advisers will cover the costs of that 
research by directing trades at premium commissions to the broker in 
the future.131 The adviser, though, is under no obligation to continue to 
direct trades to the broker and can walk away at any time, retaining the 
research.132 This arrangement helps to decrease broker shirking and to 
tie brokers’ interests to those of the client. In these situations, the 
broker has effectively fronted a performance bond to the adviser, 
ensuring the adviser that the broker’s trading execution will be 
successful,133 lest it lose both its investment in the fronted soft dollars 
and future business from the adviser. The result is that the soft dollar 
arrangement incentivizes the broker to effectively execute client trades 
to protect its investment in the adviser.134 This decreased agency cost 
should benefit the client’s portfolio through more favorable trade 
 
 128. Id. at 96.  
 129. See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing agency problems in broker 
executions and listing examples of shirking).  
 130. See Johnsen, supra note 1, at 87 (“[E]xecution quality, and especially ‘price impact,’ are 
notoriously difficult to assess in the short run.”); Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 62 (“In noisy 
security markets the quality of broker executions is impossible for the manager to know ex ante 
and difficult to determine even ex post except over an extended course of trading.”). 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 48–50.  
 132. Horan & Johnsen, supra note 6, at 58 (“[T]he manager is free to terminate the broker at 
any time with no legal obligation to make the promised trades.”).  
 133. Id. at 59 (“[T]he broker’s up-front provision of research constitutes a . . . performance 
bond that benefits investors by assuring the quality of broker executions.”). 
 134. See id. at 64 (explaining that an up-front soft dollar payment is a “nonsalvageable capital 
investment” that works to ensure quality performance).  
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execution and better price impact, resulting in greater portfolio 
returns.  
In sum, conflicts of interest may—and often do—result in advisers 
abusing soft dollars to the detriment of their clients. Soft dollar 
arrangements, however, can actually help to mitigate conflicts of 
interest and compel brokers and advisers to act in the best interests of 
their clients. Furthermore, soft dollar arrangements work to increase 
the universe of investment information available to advisers, allowing 
advisers to be better informed and make decisions that lead to greater 
risk-adjusted returns for their clients.135 In light of these benefits, the 
United States should not follow the European Union model or ban soft 
dollars entirely. Instead, less drastic changes in the regulatory 
framework to deter or eliminate abuses are appropriate.  
III.  WHY THE SOFT DOLLAR SAFE HARBOR SHOULD BE REPEALED 
The federal government has chosen to provide a safe harbor for 
the use of soft dollars, protecting their use in the vast majority of 
circumstances. But this safe harbor, combined with lackluster 
disclosure requirements, has enabled some advisers to misuse their 
clients’ commission dollars. Abuses persist, and advisers’ actions are 
often hidden from view. Moreover, the safe harbor’s original 
rationales—promoting the availability of investment research and 
protecting advisers that use soft dollar arrangements but lack sufficient 
technology to prove compliance with their fiduciary duties—no longer 
hold, and the safe harbor runs contrary to general principles of agency 
law and fiduciary duties. Thus, a reinvigorated regulatory framework 
is necessary. The safe harbor should be repealed and replaced. 
A. The Original Rationales for the Safe Harbor No Longer Hold 
As the Supreme Court has explained, the primary purpose of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is 
to “deter fraud and manipulative practices in the securities market, and 
to ensure full disclosure of information material to investment 
decisions.”136 Congress maintained this purpose when it created the 
soft dollar safe harbor as part of the Securities Act Amendments in 
 
 135. See id. at 71 (explaining that account performance improves when advisers increase the 
use of premium commissions).  
 136. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“One of [the Exchange Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors 
through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securities . . . .”). 
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1975, which sought to promote both consumer protection and strong 
capital markets.137 But while the safe harbor may have been the best 
available mechanism at the time to further those objectives, its 
rationales no longer hold today.  
The legislative history surrounding the creation of the soft dollar 
safe harbor reveals two primary concerns underlying its enactment. 
First, the safe harbor alleviated adviser concerns that, without the safe 
harbor, brokerage houses would find it unprofitable to continue to 
produce the research that many advisers relied on.138 Second, the safe 
harbor dispelled concerns that fiduciary duties would force advisers to 
accept the lowest available execution-only commission rate, forgoing 
premium broker agreements that included research benefits.139 
Relatedly, advisers worried that their technological inability to 
maintain records verifying that premium commissions benefitted a 
specific client would make it difficult to demonstrate that they had not 
breached their fiduciary duties.140  
In hearings before the Subcommittee on Securities of the 
Commission on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, four brokerage 
firms issued a joint statement supporting the safe harbor.141 Without 
the safe harbor, they concluded, there “would be a material reduction 
in research services, particularly for smaller and medium-sized 
financial institutions, and, in our view, a concurrent damaging of our 
capital markets.”142 Ray Garrett, Jr., the Chairman of the SEC, 
reiterated these concerns, noting that most advisers obtained some, if 
 
 137. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 
322 (explaining that the purpose of the amendments was “to provide greater investor protection 
and bolster sagging investor confidence” while preserving an efficient market for capital). 
 138. See S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 69 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 247 (stating 
that investment managers “have relied on the fact that portfolio activity would generate a supply 
of research and analysis from the brokerage industry” and that “the future availability and quality 
of research . . . could be jeopardized” without the safe harbor).  
 139. Id. at 70. 
 140. See 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *6 (stating that “a disclosure requirement of the 
extent to which research was or will be obtained to benefit specific or all accounts of an investment 
manager would be unreasonably complicated” and that, since research often benefits many 
clients, it is “impracticable to ‘allocate’ specifically this benefit among those accounts”). 
 141. To Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 
249 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
94th Cong. 329–31 (1975) (statement of Charles H. Mott, President, Baker, Weeks & Co.; Richard 
H. Jenrette, President, Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp.; Donald B. Marron, 
President, Mitchell, Hutchins, Inc.; and Bernard H. Garil, Vice President, Assistant to the 
Managing Partner, Oppenheimer & Co.).  
 142. Id. at 330. 
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not all of their research from brokerage firms executing their 
transactions.143 Garrett worried that, without the safe harbor, broker-
provided research would become unprofitable,144 in turn leading to a 
reduction in available research, which would harm those advisers that 
were too small to develop their own research outfits.145 The Senate 
agreed with this assessment and adopted the safe harbor.146  
In a world where brokerage houses produced the vast majority of 
investment research,147 Congress’s motivations for creating the soft 
dollar safe harbor were well founded. But two developments since 1975 
have weakened the safe harbor’s research-availability rationale. First, 
assets have increasingly concentrated in the hands of large institutional 
advisers that can afford in-house research systems.148 As discussed 
above, one of the initial goals of the safe harbor was to protect research 
availability for small advisers. Although institutionalization has led 
many of these shops to disappear,149 the asset management industry 
was once dominated by small managers that offered active portfolio 
management services.150 Since 1975, however, “the largest institutional 
investors have quadrupled their holdings in the equity market.”151 
Economies of scale have allowed these large institutional investors to 
develop their in-house research services, decreasing their reliance on 
broker-provided research. Today, where small managers in need of 
protection are fewer and further between, the harms resulting from the 
 
 143. Id. at 201 (statement of Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman, SEC).  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 202.  
 146. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248 (concluding 
that “the future availability and quality of research and other services in an environment of 
unfixed rates could be jeopardized, with potentially harmful consequences to all investors”). 
 147. See Johnsen, supra note 31, at 1556 (stating that “the small number of full-service 
brokerage houses that dominated the NYSE produced most of the investment research”).  
 148. See, e.g., What We Do, BLACKROCK, (last visited Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/insights/blackrock-investment-institute/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/
9DWP-EV95] (noting that the BlackRock Investment Institute “originate[s] research on markets, 
economics, portfolio construction and cross-asset themes such as geopolitics”). 
 149. See Itzhak Ben-David, Developments in the Asset Management Industry, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2017/07/20/developments-in-the-asset-management-industry/ [https://perma.cc/6KA5-MQDY] 
(finding that, in 1980, the top ten asset managers owned about 5 percent of the U.S. market, but, 
by 2016, the top ten managers owned about 23 percent).  
 150. Id. 
 151. Itzhak Ben-David, The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/08/01/the-granular-nature-of-large-institutional-investors/ [https://perma.cc/P6WD-
ZWXD]. 
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safe harbor far outweigh its potential benefits. This institutionalization 
eliminates one of the original justifications for the safe harbor.  
Second, independent research providers—companies that do not 
act as brokers, but provide research reports and conclusions for a direct 
fee—have taken a greater share of the research market. Access to 
independent research allows smaller advisers to purchase research 
outside of a soft dollar arrangement, obviating the need to bolster 
broker-provided research via the safe harbor. Independent researchers 
have been growing and are expected to reach twenty percent market 
share soon.152  
Technological advancements have also weakened the safe 
harbor’s fiduciary-duty rationale. Advisers have a duty “to act 
primarily for the benefit of [the client] in matters connected with [their] 
undertaking.”153 There is no reason that this duty cannot be met while 
still directing client trades to premium brokers in exchange for research 
and execution.154 However, actually proving that premium 
commissions primarily benefit individual clients can pose a challenge. 
In 1975, advisers did not have the technology to accurately record, 
track, and store the multitude of soft dollar transactions they 
undertook in order to prove that the research benefitted the clients 
whose commissions generated it.155 Today, widely-available record-
 
 152. Robin Wigglesworth, Final Call for the Research Analyst?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/85ee225a-ec4e-11e6-930f-061b01e23655 [https://perma.cc/MR27-
XZFV]. 
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).  
 154. Many advisers believed that the safe harbor was necessary to satisfy the fiduciary rule 
that a principal cannot receive a benefit from its relationship with an agent. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“The trustee is under a duty to the 
beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.”); Jorden, supra note 
27, at 1108 (stating the “general rule” that a fiduciary “is not entitled to receive a benefit from the 
administration of the trust property . . . other than as compensation for services”). This is likely 
mistaken. The better way to view soft dollars is simply as a different form of compensation for 
advisers’ services. Advisers do not receive separate benefits from soft dollars; they simply receive 
a subsidy for their expenses in managing their clients’ accounts. Without the soft dollar safe 
harbor, advisers would have to use soft dollars to benefit commission-paying clients. Further, if 
soft dollars were prohibited, advisers would likely just charge higher management fees to cover 
the cost of research. See Letter from Kurt N. Schacht & Jonathan J. Stokes, CFA Ctr. for Fin. 
Mkt. Integrity, to Florence E. Harmon, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 6, 2008), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-08/s72208-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW39-CT8Z] (stating 
the argument that advisers paying hard dollars for research would lead to increased fees for the 
investors). Even if soft dollar arrangements are seen as conferring a separate benefit, advisers can 
avoid breaching their fiduciary duties by gaining clients’ consent and fully disclosing the material 
facts surrounding the transaction. See infra Part IV.  
 155. See 1979 Release, supra note 77, at *6, *8 (explaining that disclosure of the extent to 
which research was obtained to benefit specific accounts would be “unreasonably complicated” 
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keeping and storage technology enables advisers to track with ease 
client commissions, the soft dollars generated from those commissions, 
and whether soft dollars benefit the clients paying for them. With this 
technology, advisers no longer need to worry about being unable to 
prove adherence to their fiduciary duties when using soft dollars.  
Taken together, the institutionalization of the investment 
industry, along with advances in available investment management 
technology since 1975, have significantly weakened the main rationales 
for enacting the safe harbor.  
B. The Safe Harbor Conflicts with General Principles of Agency Law 
and Fiduciary Duties 
Modern federal securities regulations have codified common-law 
fiduciary duties for investment advisers. While, on its face, Section 206 
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940156 appears to be a general 
prohibition against fraud and deceit, courts have construed the law to 
apply broad fiduciary duties to advisers.157 Under these fiduciary 
duties, advisers must act in their clients’ best interests,158 must fully 
disclose to clients all material facts affecting their relationship,159 and 
must seek best execution for the client’s trades.160 In short, investors 
should be able to expect that advisers will put client interests first when 
 
and prohibitively costly, especially for smaller advisers who would have to make computations 
manually).  
 156. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).  
 157. E.g., Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 501 (3d Cir. 2013); see Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) (understanding that the Court in SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), established “federal fiduciary standards for 
investment advisers”). 
 158. E.g., SEC v. Nutmeg Grp., LLC, 162 F. Supp. 3d. 754, 778 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Belmont, 708 
F.3d at 503.  
 159. E.g., Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 197. The standard of materiality is 
whether a reasonable client or prospective client would have considered the information 
important in deciding to invest with the adviser. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 643 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (clarifying that, for an omitted 
fact to be material, there must be a substantial likelihood that disclosure would have significantly 
altered a reasonable investor’s view of the available information). Soft dollar arrangements are 
material because of the conflicts of interest that can arise from an adviser’s receipt of a benefit in 
exchange for directing client trades to a broker and, thus, must be disclosed. Renaissance Capital 
Advisers, Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1688, 1997 WL 794479, at *3 (Dec. 22, 1997). 
 160. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *5 (1948) (“A 
corollary of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty to obtain . . . the best price 
discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence.”), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 
969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).  
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managing portfolios,161 acting with the care and loyalty required of a 
fiduciary.162  
The soft dollar safe harbor runs contrary to these general 
principles. The safe harbor allows an adviser to consider the 
reasonableness of a trade transaction in terms of “his overall 
responsibilities with respect to the accounts”163 he manages. Thus, the 
adviser need not “show that specific services benefited specific 
accounts.”164 This allows the adviser to put the interests of third-party 
clients—and those of his advisory business as a whole—ahead of the 
interests of the client paying for the trade, contrary to the adviser’s 
common law duty “not to use property of the principal for the agent’s 
own purposes or those of a third party.”165 Moreover, by allowing 
advisers to use the research generated from one client’s trades to aid 
other clients, the safe harbor relieves advisers of the common-law duty 
not to acquire material benefits from third parties through transactions 
conducted for the principal.166 
In this regard, the soft dollar safe harbor is somewhat unique. In 
other dealings with the client, advisers must adhere to fiduciary duties 
and the general principles of agency law. They must make full 
disclosure of all material facts affecting the adviser-client 
relationship,167 take reasonable care to avoid misleading clients,168 seek 
best execution of client trades,169 and act “at all times in the best 
 
 161. See id. at *4 (stating that “[t]he very function of furnishing investment counsel on a fee 
basis . . . cultivates a confidential and intimate relationship and imposes a duty upon [the adviser] 
to act in the best interests of her clients and to make only such recommendations as will best serve 
such interests.”). 
 162. See Robert J. Moran & Cathy G. O’Kelly, Soft Dollars and Other Traps for the 
Investment Adviser: An Analysis of Brokerage Placement Practices, 1 DEPAUL BUS. L.J 45, 55 
(1989) (stating that “clients can reasonably expect that their Advisers will adhere to the industry 
standards for the duties of care, skill, loyalty and any other duties . . . imputed to an Adviser.”).  
 163. 15 U.S.C § 78bb(e)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 164. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248. 
 165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).  
 166. See Jorden, supra note 27, at 1108 (stating the “general rule” that a fiduciary “is not 
entitled to receive a benefit from the administration of the trust property . . . other than as 
compensation for services”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 
1959). 
 167. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).  
 168. Id.  
 169. See In re Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 1948 WL 29537, at *5 (1948) (“A 
corollary of the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty to his principal is his duty to obtain . . . the best price 
discoverable in the exercise of reasonable diligence.”), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 
969 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
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interest” of the investor.170 Because these agency and fiduciary 
principles are present in all other aspects of the adviser-client 
relationship, the safe harbor appears out of place in the overall adviser 
regulatory scheme.  
There does not appear to be any principled reason to maintain the 
safe harbor in the adviser regulatory scheme. The safe harbor conflicts 
with fiduciary duties, and its original justifications no longer hold. In 
addition, repealing the safe harbor would remove the air of leniency 
surrounding advisers’ use of soft dollars, thus deterring abuses.  
In lieu of the safe harbor, Congress and the SEC should adopt 
increased and particularized reporting standards that require advisers 
to show clients their specific allocations and uses of soft dollars. By 
making transgressions more easily discoverable and, presumably, 
punishable by clients, such requirements would provide a strong 
incentive to avoid self-dealing and adhere to fiduciary duties. 
IV.  A CONSENT AND REPORTING FRAMEWORK FOR SOFT DOLLARS 
Beginning with the Securities Act of 1933171 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,172 the federal government has primarily 
regulated securities markets through disclosure requirements.173 
Disclosure is meant to “allow[] investors to make fully informed 
investment decisions,” thereby increasing efficiency and deterring 
adviser misconduct.174 The current mandatory disclosures regarding 
soft dollar arrangements, however, do not enable investors to make 
intelligent, informed decisions in evaluating whether to retain 
investment advisers. As discussed above, investment advisers are 
generally not required to make detailed quantitative disclosures about 
their procurement and use of soft dollars. Whereas many entities, like 
public companies, must periodically disclose the financial results of 
operations, thereby reporting to the investor what the company 
actually did with the invested funds, advisers must only describe their 
general soft dollar policies. This lack of detailed disclosure hinders the 
main goals of the disclosure regime.  
 
 170. SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds en banc 597 
F.3d 436 (2010).  
 171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).  
 172. Id. §§ 78a–78qq. 
 173. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward 
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 151 (2006).  
 174. Id. at 153–54.  
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Mandated detailed disclosures of soft dollar use would force 
advisers to periodically recount and relay their activities to their clients, 
deterring potential misconduct and promoting honest and competent 
behavior.175 Congress should repeal the Section 28(e) soft dollar safe 
harbor176 but permit advisers to use soft dollar arrangements subject to 
general fiduciary duties. This would require advisers to gain client 
consent to soft dollar arrangements and disclose the results of their 
use.177 Furthermore, the SEC, a body with greater flexibility to adapt 
its rules to developments in the soft dollar landscape,178 should 
promulgate regulations requiring more substantive disclosure of 
advisers’ soft dollar arrangements and the benefits flowing therefrom. 
This middle-ground scheme should allow investors to reap the benefits 
of soft dollar arrangements while limiting the costs of monitoring their 
advisers, resulting in fewer abuses.  
New regulations on soft dollar use should take the form of a two-
pronged consent and reporting framework. First, to promote client 
awareness about soft dollar arrangements and their potential for 
conflicts of interest, advisers should be required to obtain consent from 
all clients to engage in soft dollar arrangements before transacting on 
their behalf. This consent should be required at the time the adviser 
enters into an advisory relationship with the client, taking the simple 
form of a written document describing what soft dollar arrangements 
are, how advisers use them to benefit clients, and how the 
arrangements may create conflicts of interest. The document should 
prompt clients to assent to the adviser paying premium commissions 
when transacting on behalf of the client and receiving soft dollar 
benefits in return. Aside from the request for consent, the document 
should include many of the same disclosures about soft dollars that are 
currently required by Form ADV.179 Since advisers provide other 
documentation to their clients at the outset of their relationship, 
 
 175. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage 
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1996) (stating that corporate executives 
“behave more honestly, diligently, and competently” with mandatory periodic disclosures).  
 176. See supra Part III. 
 177. See Jorden, supra note 27; see also text accompanying note 159.  
 178. See, e.g., Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, Note, A Tale of Two Commissions: A 
Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 566 (2013) (“Instead of specifying the precise parameters of reform 
within the [Dodd-Frank] Act itself, Congress delegated this responsibility to myriad 
regulatory agencies better equipped with the requisite expertise to shape financial reform.”). 
 179. See supra Part I.D (discussing the disclosure requirements of soft dollars generally and 
those required on Form ADV specifically).  
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including the consent form is an inexpensive way to raise investor 
awareness about soft dollar arrangements. Ultimately, requiring 
consent puts the decision on how to manage soft dollars’ potential 
conflicts of interest in the hands of the client himself, and helps the 
adviser better understand what the client believes is in his best 
interest.180  
After receiving consent to engage in soft dollar arrangements, the 
SEC should require advisers to provide periodic reports to each 
consenting client, quantitatively detailing client commissions paid and 
the benefits generated and qualitatively describing the procedures used 
over the latest period to allocate trades to broker-dealers. The 
quantitative disclosures should include at the very least: (1) the total 
amount of premium commission dollars the client paid over the period, 
(2) the total premium commission dollars paid over the period across 
all consenting client accounts, (3) the total amount that would have 
been spent had the adviser directed the individual client’s trades to a 
discount broker, as well as the aggregate figure for all consenting 
accounts, (4) the total dollar value of soft dollar benefits the adviser 
received over the period and a breakdown of those benefits by 
category,181 and (5) the value of any brokerage services received by the 
individual client over the period. These individualized reports on soft 
dollar usage should be included in the adviser’s normal periodic reports 
on investment performance. With these five required disclosures, 
clients would be better able to monitor advisers’ soft dollar practices 
and ensure that the benefits received and commissions paid are in their 
best interest. 
It is worth noting that, because soft dollar arrangements work on 
a fungible credit system, it is not always possible for advisers to list the 
specific research services received in exchange for specific premium 
trading commissions.182 However, this fact does not diminish the value 
of required disclosures. The five proposed disclosures would still allow 
 
 180. It is possible that, for potential clients with small portfolios, some advisers would treat 
the consent requirement as a contract of adhesion, allowing them to turn non-consenting clients 
away. However, this should not be overly concerning: these rejections would create a market for 
advisers who appreciate the decision to forgo premium commission arrangements. And, more 
fundamentally, it is unlikely that advisers would choose to miss out on the revenue that new 
clients—even those wishing to avoid soft dollar arrangements—present. 
 181. These categories could include: domestic economic research, international economic 
research, small/mid/large capitalization value or growth equity research, or certain types of fixed-
income research. Regardless of breakdown, the categories would be required to cover all types of 
research received and include one for brokerage services.  
 182. See supra Part I.B.  
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advisers to demonstrate that each client received a share of research 
and/or brokerage services proportional to their share of the aggregate 
premium commissions the adviser directed over the period. 
By comparing individual commissions paid with aggregate 
commissions paid, clients could calculate their shares of the aggregate 
premium commissions over the period. Then, by comparing those 
figures to the amount that would have been spent had the adviser used 
discount brokers, clients could determine how much of their premium 
commissions went toward research or brokerage services. Finally, 
clients could cross-check whether they were receiving at least a 
proportional share of the adviser’s accrued soft dollar benefits by 
comparing these figures with the amount and type of soft dollar 
benefits received.183 Thus, with a bit of arithmetic, these five reported 
metrics would empower clients to better police their advisers, ensure 
their adherence to the law and the client’s interests, and determine 
whether or not to continue employing them. 
In addition to periodic, individualized client reports, the SEC 
should require a similar public filing. A publicly filed form with 
aggregated quantitative disclosures would be helpful to clients and 
prospective clients in three ways. First, public disclosures supplement 
policing by providing individual clients and consumer protection 
groups—especially unsophisticated investors that are unable to make 
use of the individualized quantitative disclosures themselves—with the 
means to ensure adviser compliance. Second, public disclosures enable 
potential clients to investigate an adviser’s soft dollar usage prior to 
entering into an advisory relationship. Third, requiring quantitative 
disclosure of the rates advisers pay in premium commissions may spur 
market competition, resulting in decreases in the average premium 
commission rate in the market.  
Compared to their value to clients, the cost of these public 
disclosures would be minor. If the proposed individualized reporting 
requirements are implemented, public disclosure, which would utilize 
the same data, would only amount to a minor incremental expense.  
Of course, quantitative disclosure requirements are still a weak 
defense against advisers that are willing to simply lie to their clients. In 
all likelihood, the Marvin & Palmer adviser who lied to his clients on 
 
 183. Because it is possible for many clients to benefit from a single research report, the 
aggregate client value of soft dollar benefits might exceed one hundred percent of the dollar value 
of those benefits. For example, a report on the U.S. economic outlook would be valuable to most 
investors. 
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Form ADV184 would still have found a way manipulate the data behind 
the suggested reporting framework’s required metrics. However, 
under the proposed reporting requirements, only the most brazen 
would attempt such deception. It is easy to check a “no” box on Form 
ADV, as Marvin & Palmer did, but it is much more difficult to craft 
consistently false quantitative reports, especially across multiple clients 
and time periods. There is only so much the law can do to prevent 
illegal behavior before it occurs, but the proposed quantitative 
reporting requirements would make misrepresentations that much 
harder. 
For disclosures and reporting to be effective, the client must read 
and be able to understand the provided information.185 The large 
amounts of information contained in disclosure forms can be difficult 
to process, and many clients are unsophisticated investors.186 To 
encourage reading and understanding, then, the above suggested soft 
dollar reporting requirements limit the data provided to five easily 
defined figures.187 Further, most of these figures are amenable to 
graphical presentation, which could enhance client understanding and 
increase the odds that clients actually read the reports. It is true that, 
after leading the client to water, the SEC cannot make him drink. But 
the simplicity and clarity of the five suggested metrics increase the 
chance that the client quenches his thirst and monitors his adviser. 
Although the costs of complying with mandatory disclosures can 
be enormous, the proposed reporting requirements are unlikely to be 
prohibitively expensive. It is true that “[c]reating, gathering, analyzing, 
summarizing, and drafting all the information necessary to generate 
the required disclosures involves extensive time and effort.”188 And 
once compiled and drafted, the costs of disseminating information to 
 
 184. See supra Part II.A.  
 185. See Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments 
and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689, 692 (1985) (stating that 
an “assumption underlying . . . required disclosure[s] is that the information . . . is both read and 
comprehended”). 
 186. See Ripken, supra note 173, at 160 (noting that “people are boundedly rational and have 
only limited cognitive abilities to process vast amounts of complex information at once”).  
 187. See id. at 160–62 (discussing the information overload problem in required disclosures); 
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 451–52 (2003) (encouraging consideration of how information 
will be used before including it in required disclosures and concluding that “[m]ore information 
is not per se better than less”).  
 188. Ripken, supra note 173, at 188. 
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clients can also be substantial.189 However, as previously mentioned, 
advisers are required to “make and keep true, accurate and current . . 
. books and records”190 containing “sufficient details relating to each 
[soft dollar] transaction.”191 Because of this requirement, advisers are 
already obligated to maintain records of the many transactions they 
take on behalf of client accounts—records that provide the data that 
underlies each of the five proposed metrics. Accordingly, the proposed 
reporting requirements do nothing to increase the cost of creating and 
gathering information. Analyzing, summarizing, and drafting reports 
does still generate some costs, but the same software an adviser uses 
for recordkeeping can easily analyze and summarize individual client 
reports. Tools like these make a reporting framework for soft dollar 
uses relatively inexpensive.  
A mandatory consent and reporting framework would expose 
improper soft dollar uses, or at least make them harder to conceal. It 
would also make advisers think twice before abusing client commission 
dollars and assure clients that their commission dollars are being spent 
in their best interest. While there is no firm data on the cost savings 
that would accrue to clients by limiting the misuse of their commission 
dollars, we can guess that, given size of the industry,192 the savings 
would likely be substantial. Independent of those savings, the benefits 
of increased transparency, deterrence, and easier monitoring support 
implementing a mandatory reporting framework. For these reasons, 
the framework offers a workable alternative to an outright ban on soft 
dollar arrangements, ensuring that advisers use soft dollars 
appropriately for their clients’ benefit.  
CONCLUSION 
The soft dollar safe harbor and inadequate reporting requirements 
have encouraged abuses of soft dollar arrangements. The safe harbor 
is outdated and runs contrary to agency and fiduciary principles. It 
should be repealed. Instead, the use of soft dollars should be governed 
by traditional fiduciary duties. To bolster these duties, the SEC should 
implement a consent and reporting framework—requiring advisers to 
 
 189. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 707–08 (1984) (discussing the direct costs of required disclosures 
and noting that these direct costs are in the billions of dollars per year).  
 190. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(a) (2017).  
 191. 1986 Guidance, supra note 54, at *8. 
 192. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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gain client consent before engaging in soft dollar arrangements and 
implementing periodic reporting requirements regarding the use of 
soft dollars. As Louis Brandeis famously said, “[s]unlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants.”193 By raising awareness of the use of soft 
dollars and exposing advisers’ practices to the light of day, this 
framework would deter advisers from using soft dollars improperly and 
empower clients to more easily monitor their agents.  
 
 193. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 
(Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914). 
